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Abstract
The new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe achieved an economic and 
political tour de force on their way to EU accession. Their next challenge is the entry 
to the eurozone. Thus, the dynamics of public opinion toward the euro become crucial 
for political leaders. We test three perspectives – economic, political, and historical-ide-
ational – with individual-level survey data from eight countries and conclude that the 
combined model best explains variations in support for the euro. In an environment 
of volatility in post-communist Europe, macro variables of economic and historical-
ideational factors have the strongest impact on individual attitudes, while micro-vari-
ables of economic self-interest do not further our understanding of euro support. Thus, 
distributional issues matter less than the aggregate national performance and experi-
ence. Political parties that garner support for the euro should therefore concentrate on 
economic consolidation and political stability rather than politicizing a winner–loser 
cleavage.
Zusammenfassung
Unter gewaltigen Anstrengungen haben es die postkommunistischen Regierungen in 
Ost- und Mitteleuropa geschafft, ihre Länder sicher zum EU-Beitritt zu führen. Als 
Nächstes sehen sie sich mit der Einführung des Euro als Gemeinschaftswährung kon-
frontiert. Infolgedessen wird für demokratische Politiker die öffentliche Meinung über 
die Euro-Einführung enorm wichtig. Wir testen drei theoretische Schulen (ökono-
misch, politisch und historisch) in Bezug auf ihre Erklärungskraft für das Verständnis 
individueller Einstellungen zum Euro. Als empirische Evidenz dienen uns individuelle 
Umfragedaten aus acht Ländern. Wir stellen fest, dass bei dem kombinierten Modell 
aller Theorieschulen der Verständnisgewinn am größten ist. Im Kontext postkommu-
nistischer Volatilität haben auf der gesellschaftlichen Ebene die wirtschaftlichen und 
historischen Faktoren den größten Einfluss. Auf der Individualebene haben die Vari-
ablen, die materielles Eigeninteresse messen, nur geringe Aussagekraft. Folglich sind 
nicht die wirtschaftlichen Verteilungswirkungen der Euro-Einführung und diesbezüg-
liche Erwartungen, sondern die nationale Performanz und historische Erfahrung von 
Bedeutung. Politische Parteien sollten sich deswegen bei ihren Versuchen, demokra-
tische Unterstützung für die Euro-Einführung zu sammeln, auf wirtschaftliche Konso-
lidierung und politische Stabilität konzentrieren und nicht eine Konfliktlinie zwischen 
Gewinnern und Verlierern der Euro-Einführung politisieren.
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Why do some individuals support the introduction of the euro and others not? Why 
is support in some countries higher than in others? Understanding these dynamics of 
domestic opposition to or support for the euro is important for the new EU member 
states because they are under the legal obligation to join the eurozone. This is even more 
relevant to those countries that have called for public legitimation of eurozone entry by 
holding referenda. 
Monetary policy is a strange animal: the mechanisms and relationships of its various 
constituent parts are highly technical and the distributional consequences diffuse. For 
example, changes in exchange rate policy have an impact on various other policies, such 
as social, wage, and fiscal policy, with consequences at the in ternational and domestic 
levels. Despite this complexity, most individuals nonetheless have an opinion on the in-
troduction of the euro. This might be explained by the fact that the currency, the money, 
the cash belong to our everyday life. It is familiar to us, and changing the currency needs 
practical adaptation from everyone.
The purpose of this article is to analyze why citizens in the new EU member states 
in Central and Eastern Europe hold different attitudes toward the euro. The analyti-
cal framework tests three main perspectives in a quantitative survey analysis of Euro-
barometer data: (a) the economic perspective where the individual forms an opinion 
based on economic evaluations; (b) the political perspective where the individual reacts 
to political dynamics in order to arrive at an attitude; (c) the historical-ideational per-
spective where individuals perceive the currency to be part of their identity. We con-
clude that our combined model of the three perspectives is more powerful in explaining 
individual attitudes toward the euro than the more parsimonious models. 
Section 1 presents the three perspectives and suggests how they can be fruitfully com-
bined. In section 2, we discuss the empirical approach, the data, and the hypotheses. 
In section 3, we conduct the analyses. Section 4 discusses the results and concludes the 
article.
1 Theories of euro support
The adoption of the euro in the new EU member states
The new EU member countries are under the legal obligation to introduce the euro 
as soon as they meet the convergence/Maastricht criteria. However, their status as 
The data set is the CCEB 2003.4 Eurobarometer. It is available from the Central Archive, Co-
logne. Our coded data set and the STATA do-files are available for replication purposes. We 
would like to thank Catherine de Vries, Holger Döring, Henrik Enderlein, Simon Hix, Mark 
Lutter, and Bill Vlcek for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.   
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“Member States with a derogation” (Art. 122 TEC) gives them some leeway in setting 
the target date. In 2007, Slovenia was the only country of this group that joined the euro 
area. Slovakia is expected to follow in 2009. For the other Central and Eastern European 
countries, the timing is still unknown; official announcements are not consistent, and 
tar get dates vary from 2009 to 2014.
Certainly, eurozone membership would enhance the new member countries’ economic 
and political credibility, which is especially important for attracting international inves-
tors, but the adherence to the Maastricht criteria also entails adjustment costs (Buiter/
Grafe 2004). In addition to the question of economic burden-sharing, the adoption of 
the euro touches upon issues of state sovereignty and culture (Jones 2002; Allam 2006), 
as giving up its national currency is related to the risk of losing a “sym bolic marker in 
nation-building efforts” (Risse 2003: 487). 
To analyze the variations in support, we draw upon the literature of public opinion on 
both European integration and the euro. An analysis combining insights from both 
strands moderates the risks associated with omitted variable bias, i.e. variables that 
would be left out if our hypotheses were solely based on either strand of literature. 
Recent studies highlight economic, political, and historical-ideational forces as sources 
for the variations in individual responses to EU and European Monetary Union (EMU) 
membership; however, they attribute different degrees of influence on the support for 
European integration to these indicators (Hooghe/Marks 2005; de Vries/van Kersber-
gen 2007; Jupille/Leblang 2007). 
Economic explanations
Economic models explain support for and opposition to the euro with reference to 
utilitarian factors. The argument is that public opinion on the euro is determined by 
citizens’ assessment of the personal and aggregate costs and benefits associated with 
eurozone membership.
Economic theories argue that public opinion on European integration is consistent with 
economic self-interest and dependent on economic conditions (Baldwin 1989; Buch/
Hansen 2002; Gabel 1998; Anderson/Reichert 1996). With regard to public opinion on 
the euro in the old EU member states, Gabel (1998) shows that economic interests are 
closely related to the distributional consequences of exchange rate stability, inflation 
policy, cross-border shopping, and capital market liberalization. Gabel takes Frieden’s 
(1991, 1994) argument on producer group preferences over exchange rate levels to the 
individual level and concludes that the opportunities provided by EMU membership 
are particularly strong for owners and highly skilled workers, whereas unskilled work-
ers have to bear the burden of adjustment to European monetary integration (cf. also 
Frieden/Broz 2001). Those citizens whose income, amount of capital assets, and level of 
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occupational skills are high relative to the national average are more supportive. They 
benefit from eurozone membership reducing the transaction costs for cross-border 
capital investments. Public sector employees are less supportive as they are more vul-
nerable to cuts in public expenditure, whereas the unemployed are more supportive of 
the euro as budget cuts in public subsidies would increase the rate of job creation in the 
emergent private sector (Rodrik 1995). In addition, manual workers and left-wing party 
supporters are less likely to support the euro than managers and right-wing party sup-
porters because left-wing supporters perceive the EU as a driving force for further labor 
market deregulation (Hooghe/Marks 2005; Oatley 1997). 
Political explanations
Political explanations focus on political values and citizens’ preferences. The argument 
is that public opinion on the euro is cued by political partisanship and attitudes toward 
the domestic political system.
Contrary to the parsimonious assumption of a materially driven individual, Anderson 
(1998) demonstrates that citizens are not well informed about the EU because the Euro-
pean integration process is too abstract or uninteresting. Instead, individuals use proxies 
rooted in domestic politics such as system support or government/political party sup-
port to form attitudes toward the euro. Steenbergen and Jones (2002) show that there 
is a positive correlation between the individual’s position on European integration and 
the supported political party’s position. Hooghe and Marks (2005) demonstrate that 
political cues are particularly strong when national elites are divided, i.e. citizens are 
likely to be less supportive of European integration when national elites conflict over 
EU membership. With regards to support for the euro in Sweden, Lindahl and Naurin 
(2005) argue that elite division among and within parties meant that political partisan-
ship did not play a role in the 2003 euro referendum (cf. also Aylott 2005).
Ray (2003a, 2003b) confirms that public opinion on European integration does not 
necessarily polarize along the classic left–right axis. For example, voters of left-wing 
parties support European integration and the euro because the EU supports further 
continental-wide regulations. Yet, other studies (Gabel 1998) arrive at the opposite con-
clusion, arguing that left-wing voters oppose European integration because the EU is 
perceived as a constraint on market regulation. 
Another proxy relates to the (dis-)satisfaction with the domestic system that may serve 
as a shortcut to forming attitudes toward the European integration process. According 
to Anderson (1998), citizens who are satisfied with the domestic political system, politi-
cal parties, and government are more supportive of European institutions (for an op-
posing view, cf. McLaren 2007). Jupille and Leblang (2007) show that there is a positive 
correlation between Danish support for the euro and voters’ trust in politicians (cf. also 
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Buch/Hansen 2002). Cichowski (2000) finds in five Central European countries that 
citizens who are satisfied with democracy support the free market; they are also more 
likely to take cues from political parties and to support EU membership. However, there 
is an opposing body of literature which suggests that citizens who are dissatisfied with 
the national political system are likely to support the EU precisely because the EU is 
seen as a remedy for domestic political corruption and/or the undeveloped welfare state 
(Carey 2002; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000).
Historical-ideational explanations
Historical-ideational explanations focus on the relationship between individual atti-
tudes toward the euro and conceptions of national identity. The argument is that citi-
zens form their attitude toward the euro on the basis of non-calculated, affective consid-
erations (Carey 2002; Luedtke 2005; cf. also McLaren 2007). Defining national identity 
as the attachment of individuals to their nation, Carey (2002) shows that higher feelings 
of national identity and national pride reduce the support for European integration. 
Citizens who have an exclusive identity, i.e. who strongly identify with their national 
community, show a higher level of opposition to European integration than individuals 
who have an inclusive/multiple identity, i.e. who perceive themselves as, for example, 
Catalan, Spanish and European (Diez Medrano/Guttierez 2001). National identity had 
a substantive impact on the formation of British attitudes toward the euro and on vot-
ing choice in the 2000 Danish referendum (Gabel/Hix 2005; Jupille/Leblang 2007). By 
the same token, individuals who fear that European integration erodes national sover-
eignty, identity, and culture may show less support for EU membership (Luedtke 2005). 
As discussed above, the currency as a national symbol is an important identity marker 
for the nation state. Hobolt and Leblond (2007) argue that the value of this symbol can 
be measured by means of exchange rate stability and that citizens in Swedish and Dan-
ish referenda were more likely to oppose the single currency when the euro was seen to 
be weak vis-à-vis the national currency and other currencies. In turn, a weak national 
currency may increase support for the euro.
National identity has several components, of which national purpose and historical 
memories of national friends and enemies have shaped trust and mistrust among Eu-
ropean states to a great extent (cf. Wallace 2001). In this regard, Diez Medrano (2003) 
stresses the importance of national histories arguing that support for the EU depends 
on the experience of casualties during the Second World War as a proxy for misery. As 
European integration can be read as a peace project, the assumption is that the higher 
the deaths rate was during the Second World War, the higher the support for the EU is 
today.
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Economics, politics, and identities: Mutually exclusive or  
complementary perspectives?
We argue that the juxtaposition of the three perspectives neglects the relative impor-
tance of their complementary forces to influence public opinion. 
Put simplistically as a competing model, the economic perspective assumes that indi-
viduals’ attitudes can be closely predicted by their personal material background and 
expectations. Individuals form an attitude toward the euro that is directly related to their 
expected utility from eurozone membership. This view hinges on the rationally think-
ing homo economicus who is driven by material interests to maximize income/wealth 
and who has a strong capacity to develop a coherent system of political attitudes.
The political perspective takes the view that individuals do not form their attitudes 
independently, but are heavily influenced by political elites and by the broad attitude of 
citizens toward the national political system. Here, the link between the personal situa-
tion and support for the euro is less direct because euro support is a function of other 
attitudes.
The third, historical-ideational, perspective, finally, follows a very different logic. Indi-
vidual identity and collective memories are the primary factors that drive euro support. 
Here, the argument is that the phenomenological dynamics of attitudes toward the euro 
de pend on the meaning which citizens attach to their identity, that is, on how actors 
interpret history and identity. Thus, citizens see currencies as part of their national 
identity and develop their views as a derivate of their personal image. 
Yet, instead of seeing these perspectives as merely competing, we suggest that economic 
interests, political values, and historical-ideational concerns are all part of the social-
psychological well-being of the individual (cf. de Vries/van Kersbergen 2007). There-
fore, we argue that one perspective alone is unable to address questions of variation in 
support for the euro. Under conditions of economic and political transition, individuals 
long to minimize their considerable personal insecurity. Their experience of major in-
stitutional, political, and economic changes in the recent past have already demanded a 
lot of adjustment. EU membership and the introduction of the euro are viewed by these 
citizens in a much more insecure psychological state of mind as far as economic condi-
tions and politics are concerned than by citizens in long-established democracies and 
EU member states. The process of European integration and the introduction of the 
euro can be perceived to be a hindrance to minimizing insecurity as well as a guarantee 
of greater security. Personal well-being does not only depend on economic security – be 
it of the individual or society – but also on political stability. If we view matters, we can 
postulate complementary effects from the three perspectives: (a) individuals form their 
opinion of the euro based on a certain historical experience. For example, individuals in 
countries with higher losses in World War II may see a higher increase in their security 
deriving from a closer European Union and currency zone because the former have 
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a different historical experience of the terrors of World War II; (b) individuals relate 
their assessment of the national political situation to their euro attitude. For example, 
individuals who trust their national political institutions are in a better psychological 
situation to trust their national policy-makers to oversee further economic and political 
integration; (c) individuals make a judgment on their personal and national economic 
situation and accordingly adopt a position on the euro that enhances their personal 
security. For example, individuals with a positive economic judgment will feel secure 
enough to support the new challenges and opportunities that the introduction of the 
euro would bring. In sum, therefore, we suggest that public opinion on the euro in these 
new member states is inherently linked to the complementary effects of economics, poli-
tics and identities.
2 Methods, data and variables
We test the validity of the three perspectives in a quantitative survey analysis of Euro-
barometer data. We include eight new EU member states that were close to joining the 
EU during the survey period: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. All countries are post-communist countries that expe-
rienced a minimum of ten years of transition from socialist to democratic states and 
from command to market economies. This is of importance because the introduction 
of the euro hinges on the performance of economic indicators. We assume that the per-
sonal experience of individuals with economic ups and downs during the democratiza-
tion and transition process represents a common backdrop for the population in these 
countries. Despite the common experience as post-communist democracies and tran-
sitional economies, these countries have some economic and historical differences that 
we will use as a second level of variance in order to test the theoretical perspectives. 
We conduct multinominal logistic regressions with standard errors that are clustered 
by country. There are seven models. They represent the perspectives individually, their 
three pairwise combinations, and the most complex combination of all of them. In 
order to assess which model holds better, we compare their fit while accounting for the 
fact that they are not equally complex. We apply two statistics that punish more complex 
models and allow for a comparison of models that are not nested: the adjusted McFad-
den R² (the higher, the better) and the Aikike criterion ([AIC] the smaller, the better). 
While comparing model fit for non-nested models, however, we need to remember the 
presence of measurement error. Each variable is only an approximation of a theoretical 
concept. Some variables measure the theoretical concept very well: for example, GDP 
growth is presumably a good indicator of economic development; self-judged political 
interest, by contrast, is only a weak proxy of the political awareness and interests of an 
individual. Since variables vary in their quality as proxies, various models with differ-
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ent sets of variables might just have varying fits because of differences in measurement 
error.1 
The data that we are using is the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer from October/
November 2003 (CCEB 2003.4).2 The main question for our dependent variable was: 
“What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each 
statement, whether you are for it or against it.” Then the respondents were given a list of 
statements, the order of which was randomly rotated. The statement on the euro read: 
“A European Monetary Union with one single currency, the euro.” The answer catego-
ries were coded “For,“ “Against” or “Don’t know.” 
As discussed, the literature that we draw upon is a mixture of research on attitudes to-
ward European integration and the European Monetary Union. Clearly, we expect the 
two to be related. The answers to the long-running question on EU membership and 
euro support correlate positively (Kendall’s b = 0.43). We assume, however, that indi-
viduals generally understand that the question that we use refers to the currency and 
not the European project, i.e. we assume that we have a valid measure in our dependent 
variable. 
This article has a moderate objective. It only tries to understand why people support or 
oppose the euro since we are interested in its policy implications. Of course, we expect 
that our models can also partially explain whether an individual approves of EU mem-
bership. The attitudes toward the EU as a whole and toward the euro in particular prob-
ably reinforce each other. In a larger research project, it may therefore be interesting to 
explain the relationships between the two. In this study, however, we are interested in 
euro support only. Introducing an individual’s attitude toward the EU as another inde-
pendent variable will cause endogeneity problems and will not further our understand-
ing because it is not causally prior to euro support.
Table 1 lists all independent variables with their original coding. In the regressions, 
they were recoded to range from 0 to 1 for better comparison of impact magnitude. 
Each perspective is captured by a combination of macro-level and individual-level vari-
ables. For all models, there is a series of individual-level control variables: age at which 
1 When combining the models, there are problems of severe collinearity with regard to some 
macro variables. We only have eight countries, meaning that any macro variable can only take 
eight different values. Some of these variables from different perspectives correlate highly with 
another, for example the vote share of Euro-skeptic parties correlates with trade sensitivity, an 
empirical given that does not necessarily have theoretical underpinnings (see Table 5 in the ap-
pendix for bivariate correlation coefficients and the highest variance inflation factors from the 
models). If there is a problem of collinearity, we keep the set of variables that leads to higher 
explained variance. However, when interpreting the results, we keep the collinearity structure in 
mind.
2 The cross-national survey consists of multi-stage national probability samples of residents aged 
15 and older. The interviewing period was October 10, 2003 – November 10, 2003. Respondents 
were personally interviewed.
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Table 1 List of independent variables
Variable Observations Mean Std Dev Min Max
Government deficit in 2002 
(Eurostat 2006 a,b) 8,124 30.4 15.4 5.7 57.1
GDP per capita in 2002  
(Eurostat 2006 a,b) 8,124 6,322 2,362 4,238 11,880
Population size  
(Eurostat 2006 a,b) 8,124 9.1 11.4 1.4 38.2
Trade sensitivity  
(Eurostat 2006 a,b) 8,124 0.8 0.1 0.7 0.9
Months before next 
parliamentary election 8,124 26.6 9.7 11.0 40.0
World War II casualties relative  
to population (<5 %, 10–20 %, 
20+ %) (Keegan 1989) 8,124 2.0 0.5 1.0 3.0
Age 8,103 44.5 18.4 15.0 98.0
Living with partner 8,103 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0
Community type (rural area/
village, small or middle-sized 
town, large town) 8,088 2.0 0.8 1.0 3.0
Gender 8,124 0.0 1.0
Age at which education is 
complete (categories) 8,073 2.4 0.9 1.0 4.0
Occupation categories 8,109 1.0 4.0
Working for the public sector 7,749 0.0 1.0
Household income 8,124 5.2 2.3 1.0 10.0
Perception of national economy 
(situation of economy and 
employment in 2004 in 
comparison to 2003, additive 
index)1 8,124 –0.4 1.3 –2.0 2.0
Perception of personal economic 
situation (financial situation 
of household and personal job 
situation in 2004 in comparison to 
2003, additive index)1 8,124 –0.1 1.1 –2.0 2.0
Border resident (3 categories) 8,124 0.0 2.0
Satisfaction with national 
democracy 7,705 2.2 0.8 1.0 4.0
Trust in political institutions (legal 
system, parliament, government) 8,124 –0.9 2.2 –3.0 3.0
Self-exposure to political news 8,124 1.4 1.4 0.0 4.0
Exclusive national identity2 7,558 0.0 1.0
Religious attendance  
(never, rarely, frequently) 7,902 1.9 0.7 1.0 3.0
See text for most variable details.
1 What are your expectations for the year to come: Will 2004 be better, worse or the same,  
 when it comes to …?
2 In the near future, do you see yourself? As [Nationality] only.
Allam, Goerres: Adopting the Euro in Post-Communist Countries 13
full-time education finished, gender, age, occupation (white collar, manual labor, self-
employed, or economically inactive), living with partner, and rural–urban residency 
(cf. Bielasiak 2002; Gabel 1998; Inglehart/Rabier 1978; Gelleny/Anderson 2000; Nelson/
Guth 2000; Rodrik 1995). 
The economic perspective includes most variables, up to four macro variables and five 
individual-level variables. Generally, we expect individuals to link the perceived state 
of their economy and their own economic situation to their support for the euro. The 
degree to which an economy can benefit from the euro is approximated by trade sen-
sitivity. The more an economy trades with EU states, the more it benefits from a com-
mon currency without currency risks/transaction costs and the more its citizens should 
support the euro. Past state deficit is used as a proxy for past economic fortunes. The 
higher the deficit, the more citizens are likely to support the euro because they have 
experienced the insecurities of an unstable economy. As in the historical-ideational per-
spective subsequently, we include population size in the list of economic proxies. In 
line with the theory of optimum currency areas, citizens in small and open economies 
benefit more from a monetary union (McKinnon 1963). From the economic perspec-
tive, we therefore hypothesize that citizens in low-population countries benefit more 
from the euro because most domestic prices are linked to prices on the international 
mar kets; therefore, exchange rate stability brought about by a currency union increases 
price stability. GDP per capita and economic growth are further factors affecting the 
likelihood of euro support. There are two competing explanations. On the one hand, 
individuals in economically more prosperous societies might be more willing to take 
on the perceived risk of further economic integration. On the other hand, individuals 
in relatively less successful economies may perceive the eurozone entry as a means not 
only to obtain a stable currency but also to enhance the country’s economic credibility 
(Allam 2006). 
The five individual-level variables of the economic perspective are household income, 
working in the public sector, border residency, an additive index of the personal percep-
tion of the national economy (from two items), and an additive index of the perception 
of the personal economic situation (from two items). The perceptions of national and 
personal economic situation should be positively related to EU support (Tucker et al. 
2002; Buch/Hansen 2002). Those individuals with a more positive outlook are likely 
to consider their country ready to join the euro. We expect citizens whose income and 
amount of capital assets are high relative to the national average to be more support-
ive of the euro because they benefit more from capital market liberalization and lower 
transaction costs of cross-border capital investment; in contrast, citizens with lower in-
come levels are more vulnerable to capital liberalization and cuts in public and welfare 
spending and therefore less supportive of the euro (Gabel 1998).
Public sector employees are hypothesized to be less enthusiastic about the euro and the 
associated fiscal reforms, given that they are potential targets for fiscal austerity mea-
sures and cuts in government spending (Rodrik 1995). We expect residents of border 
14 MPIfG Discussion Paper 08 / 1
regions to be more supportive of the euro than non-border residents because the for-
mer are more likely to benefit from increasing cross-border exchanges of goods and ser-
vices (Gabel/Whitten 1997). This effect should be even higher for those living in regions 
that border on current eurozone member states because the benefits of the common 
currency are more apparent. 
The political perspective is captured by two macro-level and three individual-level vari-
ables. The months before the next parliamentary election are used to capture period 
effects. We expect citizens in countries that are closer to the next election to be less 
supportive of the euro. We assume that this is due to the populist arguments against 
further Europeanization that are likely to be ventured by many politicians at a time of 
rapid political change. The second macro variable is the share of Euro-skeptic parties at 
the last election. The median voter in some party systems is more pro-European than in 
others. The smaller the vote share of Euro-skeptic parties is, the more pro-European is 
the median voter and the more supportive of the euro is the average individual in that 
country (classification of parties according to Taggart/Szczerbiak 2004; Beichelt 2004).
We include two variables to capture the individual’s relationship with the national po-
litical system. We expect individuals with a more positive evaluation of their own na-
tional system to be more in favor of the euro, although, as stated above, the opposite ar-
gument exists as well in the area of European integration (i.e. individuals may perceive 
European integration as a remedy for the political “misery” of their country). The two 
proxies are the degree of satisfaction with democracy in the respective country and an 
additive index of the degree of trust in the national parliament, the legal system, and 
the national government. Finally, we include a variable that measures how strongly an 
individual is exposed to political news, measured as an index of reading, hearing, and 
watching political news. The expectation is that those individuals who are more politi-
cally informed are more likely to have an opinion. To our dismay, this survey did not 
include any measure of ideological left–right placement. Therefore, we cannot directly 
estimate this aspect of the political perspective.
The third, historical-ideational, explanation is approximated by two macro-level vari-
ables, the number of deaths during World War II relative to the population (in three 
categories) and the size of the population. The number of war casualties represents the 
notion of recent large-scale misery that persists in the collective memory. The experi-
ence of World War II is still shared by a sizeable proportion of the populace. The expec-
tation is that citizens in countries that suffered more during the war are more support-
ive of the euro because they see the euro as another means to assure peace in the future. 
Along similar lines, citizens in smaller countries are expected to be more supportive of 
the euro because the currency binds that society more strongly to the supranational 
European entity and makes them less vulnerable to bigger neighboring countries. At the 
individual level, the most important variable is whether or not individuals define them-
selves exclusively in national terms. If they do, they are less likely to support the euro 
because they value the symbolic rather than the economic meaning of their currency. 
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Individuals who fear that European integration erodes national sovereignty, identity, 
and culture may show less support for eurozone membership. We expect the fear of los-
ing the newly regained sovereignty to be particularly relevant for opposition to the euro 
in new democracies, given that the national currency is an important ‘sym bolic marker 
in nation-building efforts’ (Jones 2002; Risse 2003: 487).
In addition, we capture whether the respondent shares a border region with another 
new member state or with a current eurozone member state. In contrast to the economic 
perspective, we anticipate for the historical-ideational perspective that the populations 
of border regions are less supportive of the euro than residents of non-border regions 
because the introduction of the euro will intensify cross-border cultural exchange and 
thus threaten their identity. This effect should be even stronger for residents along the 
border with the current eurozone member states where the common currency has alleg-
edly undermined state sovereignty and threatened national identity. Finally, individuals 
who are more religious are hypothesized to be less supportive of the euro. Strong reli-
gious conviction can be the expression of a more intense involvement in a conservative 
milieu in which primordial, ideational identities are held high.
3 Empirical section
Table 2 shows the distribution of responses in the eight countries under investigation. 
The most pro-euro country here is Slovenia, which has already joined the eurozone at 
our time of writing, followed by Slovakia and Hungary. The most opposed to eurozone 
entry is Estonia.
Table 3 shows a series of three regressions (models 1–3): the pure economic, the po-
litical, and the historical-ideational model. Each model entails two columns that list 
the predictors of the difference between the baseline (the respondent answered “Don’t 
know”) and the two other answers (“Against” and “For”). Since all variables range from 
a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 1, the coefficients can be directly compared as to the 
magnitude of their impact.
According to the adjusted R², the economic model fits best, followed by the historical 
and the political models. According to the AIC, the historical-ideational model fits bet-
ter than the economic one. It might be plausible to consider the historical-ideational 
model as faring best. The variables measuring the historical-ideational perspective (for 
example, estimated deaths in World War II or self-judged identity with the nation state) 
can be supposed to contain more measurement error than the economic variables (for 
example GDP per capita and household income). Therefore, the size of impact mea-
sured through the historical variables is likely to underestimate the ‘true’ meaning of 
these dynamics.
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In all models, some significant variables have the same signs in both columns, such as 
age. This means that the variable predicts whether an individual is more or less likely to 
adopt an attitude, no matter what the direction of attitude is. We call these “stimulating” 
variables. These stimulating variables are: age, household income, and self-exposure 
to political news with the coefficients sometimes being insignificant for one category. 
Younger, richer, and more politically informed individuals are more likely to have an 
opinion on the euro. 
According to the economic model (model 1), macro-level experiences are important 
for the individual. The most important predictor of being in favor of the euro, rather 
than being against or having no opinion, is the perception of the national economy. In 
contrast, the personal economic situation does not matter. Whether individuals have a 
more positive or negative outlook on their personal economic situation does not add to 
our understanding of euro attitudes. Also, the experience of higher government deficits 
makes individuals less likely to be against the euro compared to having no opinion or 
being in favor of the euro. Along similar grounds, high GDP per capita is associated 
with more people being in favor of the euro. Thus, individuals seem to long for the cred-
ibility of their currency supporting a strong economy. The size of the population, in this 
model, has a negative impact on the euro. Individuals in more populated countries are 
more likely to be against it. As we shall see, however, the latter effect is not stable.
Thus, model 1 shows that citizens in Central and Eastern Europe gain their support for 
EMU based on the correct macroeconomic assessment because the euro with its strict 
price stability target can stabilize a national economy but does not necessarily change 
its real development.3 The effect for individuals living in border regions is also captured 
as predicted in the economic explanation. Those citizens living close to other EU coun-
tries, be it new or old ones, are more supportive of the euro, as a common currency 
3 In fact, the real convergence parameters of the Maastricht criteria are only secondary in nature 
(Backé 1999: 121). 
Table 2 Euro support in eight Central and Eastern European countries in 2003
Answer categories
Against Don’t know For
Slovenia 11  7 82
Hungary 19 19 62
Slovakia 19 11 70
Czech Rep. 24 16 61
Lithuania 26 15 59
Poland 30 13 57
Latvia 30 16 54
Estonia 41 11 48
Total 25 13 62
Question wording see text.
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Table 3 Multinominal logistic regression models 1–3 of euro support in eight post-communist  
 countries in 2003
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef Coef Coef
Baseline = Don‘t know
Against For Against For Against For
Macro-level variables
Government deficit –1.44*** 0.18
GDP per capita –0.18 0.69*
Population size 0.63*** 0.24 –0.75* –0.23
Trade sensitivity 0.27 0.17
Vote share of Euro-skeptic parties –0.08 –0.06
Months before parl. election 0.72 0.41
Deaths WWII relative to pop. 1.57*** 0.32* 
Individual-level variables
Controls
Age –0.21 –0.79*** –0.50* –1.35*** –0.21 –0.92***
Living with partner 0.07 0.20 0.07 0.16 0.16 0.27* 
Community size 0.18 0.19 0.26 0.15 0.24 0.24
Female (BL male) –0.02 –0.28*** 0.08 –0.18* –0.01 –0.33***
Education 0.10 0.90*** 0.25 0.67*** 0.13 0.72***
Manual workers  
(BL manager, other white-collar) 0.27** 0.15 0.23** 0.12 0.23* 0.05
Economically inactive 0.14 –0.03 0.05 –0.10 –0.01 –0.16
Self-employed 0.15 –0.06 0.15 –0.05 0.16 –0.11
Economic variables
Public sector employee  
(BL private sector) –0.02 –0.02
Household income 0.48*** 0.74***
Perception of national economy –0.88*** 0.60***
Perception of personal economic 
conditions –0.15 0.18
Resident of border region with  
new member state  
(BL not resident of border region) 0.17 0.56* 0.10 0.28
Resident of border region with  
old member state 0.17 0.72*** –0.14 0.68***
Political variables
Satisfaction with democracy –0.90*** 0.83***
Political trust –0.48* 0.00
Self-exposure to political news 0.59*** 0.97***
Historical-ideational variables
Exclusive national identity 0.34** –0.64***
Religious attendance 0.04 0.10
Constant 0.90* –0.18 0.48 0.99*** –0.31 1.44***
Observations 7,637 7,589 7,283
AIC 12,841 12,844 12,193
Loglikelihood –6,413 –6,415 –6,089
Adj. McFadden R² 0.077 0.057 0.062
Unstandardized coefficients, unweighted observations, all variables range from 0 to 1, significant at 
0.05/0.01/0.001 (*/**/**) level, BL = baseline category, standard errors clustered by country.
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increases cross-border exchanges and reduces the costs of cross-border shopping. Two 
control variables, age and education, also have a sizeable impact. Whereas the positive 
effect of education in both columns suggests the attitude-forming capacity of higher 
education, the direction of impact of age, which is consistent across all models, points 
to the higher salience of the euro for younger people. This is not surprising given that 
EMU is a major policy affecting the future. The younger the respondent, the longer the 
lifespan is that is affected by its introduction. The impact that is in the same direction 
in both columns rejects any notion of generational differences in political preferences. 
Older people are not less in favor of the euro; they are just less likely to have an opinion 
on the euro.
The political model 2 is the weakest of all three in terms of its explained variance. None 
of the macro variables captures any systematic variance. There are five variables with 
sizeable impacts: the two control variables, age and education, which we have already 
seen in model 1, trust in political institutions, satisfaction with democracy, and self-ex-
posure to political news. The latter is one of the stimulating variables: the more a person 
follows political news, the more likely they are to have an opinion on the euro. Political 
trust, by contrast, discriminates between individuals who are against the euro and those 
who are in favor of the euro or do not have an opinion. The latter clearly indicates the 
importance of the individual’s attitude toward the national political system for predict-
ing their attitude toward joining the euro, although the direction is only one-sided. If 
citizens lose trust in the domestic political system, they will be joining the “no” camp. 
High levels of trust are not necessarily linked with being in favor of the euro as some 
authors have suggested (cf. Jupille/Leblang 2007; Buch/Hansen 2002). By contrast, rais-
ing levels of satisfaction with democracy lead from being against the euro to having no 
opinion and then to being in favor of the euro.
Table 4 Multinominal logistic regression models 4–7 of euro support in eight  
 post-communist countries in 2003
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Coef Coef Coef Coef
Baseline = Don‘t know
Against For Against For Against For Against For
Macro-level variables
Government deficit –1.39*** 0.47 –1.29*** 1.53*** –1.48*** 1.57***
GDP per capita –0.10 0.41 0.02 1.14*** 0.02 1.02***
Population size 0.47*** 0.13 –1.01 –0.71 0.21 –1.76*** 0.49 –1.78***
Trade sensitivity 0.06 –0.20 0.48 0.33 0.22 0.12
Vote share of euro-
skeptic parties 0.74* 0.20
Months before  
parliamentary election 0.34 0.49 0.45 0.34 0.42 0.18
Deaths WWII relative  
to population 1.54** 0.57 0.38 2.50*** –0.17 2.44***
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Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Coef Coef Coef Coef
Baseline = Don‘t know
Against For Against For Against For Against For
Individual-level variables
Controls
Age –0.58* –1.19*** –0.65** –1.28*** –0.38 –0.70* –0.72*** –1.03***
Living with partner –0.06 0.08 0.01 0.14 0.05 0.18 –0.11 0.04
Community size 0.13 0.10 0.28 0.12 0.17 0.21 0.09 0.11
Female (BL male) 0.06 –0.18* 0.03 –0.23*** –0.05 –0.31*** 0.03 –0.21* 
Education –0.01 0.64*** 0.12 0.46** 0.01 0.62*** –0.11 0.40* 
Manual workers  
(BL manager, other 
white-collar) 0.24* 0.18* 0.24* 0.14 0.25* 0.13 0.26* 0.22** 
Economically inactive 0.19 0.06 0.05 –0.03 0.11 –0.01 0.18 0.12
Self-employed 0.11 –0.05 0.14 –0.06 0.15 –0.08 0.14 –0.03
Economic variables
Public sector employee 
(BL private sector) –0.06 –0.07 0.03 –0.02 0.00 –0.07
Household income 0.61*** 0.79*** 0.46*** 0.70*** 0.57** 0.75***
Perception of national 
economy –0.68*** 0.46*** –0.82*** 0.57*** –0.66*** 0.44***
Perception of personal 
economic conditions –0.21 –0.02 –0.09 0.14 –0.10 0.04
Resident of border 
region with new 
member state  
(BL not resident of 
border region) 0.09 0.53** 0.14 0.58*** 0.09 0.60***
Resident of border 
region with old  
member state 0.03 0.68*** 0.01 0.23 0.02 0.29
Political variables
Satisfaction with 
democracy –0.77*** 0.62*** –0.76*** 0.70*** –0.72*** 0.56***
Political trust –0.37* –0.02 –0.44* –0.08 –0.44** 0.00
Self-exposure  
to political news 0.59*** 0.93*** 0.59*** 0.85*** 0.57*** 0.84***
Historical-ideational 
variables
Exclusive national 
identity 0.38*** –0.49*** 0.27 –0.55*** 0.29* –0.44***
Religious attendance 0.11 0.12 0.22* –0.01 0.23* –0.05
Constant 1.34*** –0.28 –0.40 1.21* 0.57 –1.24*** 1.25* –1.35** 
Observations 7,263 6,965 6,989 6,695
AIC 11,735 11,301 11,185 10,352
Loglikelihood –5,860 –5,643 –5,585 –5,169
Adj. McFadden R² 0.089 0.069 0.093 0.107
Unstandardized coefficients, unweighted observations, all variables range from 0 to 1, significant at 
0.05/0.01/0.001 (*/**/**) level, BL = baseline category, standard errors clustered by country.
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Finally, in the historical-ideational model 3, next to the two controls, age and educa-
tion, the following four variables stand out as having the strongest impact: the rela-
tive number of casualties in World War II, population size, individual possession of an 
exclusive national identity, and residence in a border region with an old EU member 
state. As stated above, living in a border region has a positive impact, which is in line 
with the economic explanation but runs counter to our assumptions hypothesized from 
the historical-ideational perspective. The direction of impact of the experience of losses 
between 1939 and 1945 is positive in both columns of this model. But in later models, 
the sign changes, which is a direct consequence of the low number of countries in this 
study, and we shall come back to this point. Along similar lines, population size is nega-
tively related to being against the euro, a finding that stands in contrast to what we saw 
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Figure 1 Predicted probabilities for being against and for the euro, groups of variables
First row = impact on being in “in favor” category; second row = impact on being in “against” category.
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in model 1. Having an exclusive national identity raises the probability of having no 
opinion or a negative opinion of the euro. Clearly, strong, exclusively national feelings 
are associated with less support for the euro. 
To sum up the discussion of the single models, we can say that the economic and the 
historical-ideational models fare best. What we now need to test is the extent to which 
we can fruitfully combine the three perspectives to arrive at an even better fit, while tak-
ing growing complexity of the models into consideration. 
Let us now compare four models that hierarchically build on the three pure models (cf. 
Table 4). There are three pairwise combinations (the economic-political model 4, the 
political-historical model 5, the economic-historical model 6) and a combination of all 
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22 MPIfG Discussion Paper 08 / 1
three perspectives (economic-political-historical model 7). Of the pairwise combina-
tions, the economic-historical model fares best. It is better than the other two pairwise 
combinations and better than all single individual models. Adding more variables to the 
model also increases the number of significant coefficients. This means that these new 
predictors help to clarify the effects of predictors already included.
In the pairwise models, the coefficients of population size keep changing although the 
direction of impact of the significant coefficients tells the same story. This change is prob-
ably due to the high correlation with the variable measuring WWII casualties (r = 0.61). 
Nevertheless, we are confident that the more plausible impact is the one shown in mod-
els 6 and, later, 7. Living in less populous countries leads to a higher likelihood of being 
for the euro. This finding is in line with the historical-ideational perspective rather than 
the economic one. Despite the high correlation with the variable measuring WWII loss, 
we suggest that there are two independent impacts here that are both in line with the 
historical-ideational perspective. The two variables correlate positively in this sample; 
but the two impacts are in opposite directions and are also significant. Citizens in small 
countries and in countries with high World War II losses tend to be more in favor of 
the euro. The theoretical notion is the same. Individuals see the euro as further guar-
anteeing peace and minimizing their insecurity that comes from demographic (small 
country) and historical givens (suffering during World War II).
The economic-political-historical model 7 includes all variables from models 1, 2 and 3, 
except for strength of Euro-skeptic parties that strongly correlates with trade sensitivity 
and increases collinearity. Overall, the most complex model can explain most system-
atic variance (adj. R² = 0.107; AIC = 10,352) despite being less parsimonious. Knowing 
something about the economic, political, and historical contexts and attitudes of an 
individual maximizes our understanding of variation in euro support. Apart from the 
two political macro-level variables, the coefficients of the other macro-level variables 
are now significantly simultaneously in the same model. This is an interesting finding 
because, despite collinearity, their effect is still clear enough to be significant.4 
Figure 1 summarizes the magnitude of effects, which are significant at the 0.05 level, by 
comparing the predicted probability of the variable at its maximum with the probabil-
ity of the variable at its minimum. We have projected values for being in the “against” 
category and the “for” category. At first glance, we see that the magnitude of what the 
control variables explain is rather low. This means that our theoretical variables tend to 
help us more to understand individual-level variations in support for the euro than the 
additional control variables. The explanatory power of this integrated model is there-
fore satisfactory and higher than any explanation hidden behind the control variables.
The biggest effects stem from four macro variables. The economic variables GDP per 
capita and state deficit, together with population size and number of world war casual-
4 As can be expected in large samples, the high level of collinearity still allows precise enough 
estimates to adequately assess the direction of impact.
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ties, demonstrate the utmost importance of the historical and economic macro context 
of each individual. Individuals are more supportive of the euro in societies that (a) are 
smaller demographically, (b) are more prosperous economically, (c) experienced more 
casualties during World War II relative to their populations, and (d) have a large state 
deficit. Next in size come the individual-level variables, the satisfaction with democracy 
and the assessment of the national economic situation. Since the latter can conceptu-
ally also be seen as a macro variable, we can say that, on the macro level, economic and 
historical experiences are most important whereas, on the individual level, it is rather 
the political experience that matters. 
4 Conclusions: Discussion of results and their implications  
for theory and policy
The analysis distils a compact model drawing from three perspectives – economics, 
politics, and historical identities – to explain why individuals hold different attitudes 
toward the euro. The formation of attitudes toward the euro is far more complex than 
any economic analysis of weighing the individual costs and benefits would suggest. In 
fact, the complexity of monetary policy makes it impossible to see individual attitudes 
toward the euro as being only related to personal economic situation and socio-eco-
nomic status. An integrated approach pays tribute to the fact that the European Union 
is increasingly a project of non-economic nature, most importantly since Maastricht. 
Thus, it is logical to expect individual attitudes toward the euro to be also structured by 
non-economic, e.g. historical and political, characteristics of the society in question (cf. 
also Eichenberg/Dalton 2007). 
The most striking result of our study is that the macro-level variables of the economic 
and historical-ideational perspectives have a stronger impact factor than the micro-
level variables. We suggest that public opinion on the euro is in large part a function of 
four factors. First, on the one hand, support for the euro hinges on the success of the 
economic transition. A thriving economy impacts positively on the individual’s support 
for the euro. On the other hand, the importance of the macro variable of a large state 
deficit suggests that citizens perceive the euro as a means to enhance economic stability 
and security. We therefore assume that EMU membership is viewed as a guarantee for 
the continuation of economic reforms. Second, support for the euro draws on historical 
idiosyncrasies because the relative number of casualties in WWII has one of the stron-
gest impacts on the formation of public opinion on the euro. This, however, does not 
compete with economic variables, given that the common currency in the historical-
ideational perspective is to maintain peace in Europe that complements the wish to 
continue free market reforms. Third, support for the euro is influenced by political cir-
cumstances, especially the individual’s satisfaction with democracy. Those who perceive 
their national system to be adequate are more willing to take on the challenges of euro 
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introduction. Fourth, support for the euro is decreased when citizens have an exclusive 
national identity. For these individuals, their well-being is anchored in their national 
polity, and changes to this situation decrease their anticipated security.
Our study supports existing research that points to the critical aspect of the macro 
variables of the economic and historical-ideational perspectives and shows that existing 
models needs to be adjusted when applied to transition economies. For example, the 
micro variables of economic self-interest do not further our understanding of euro sup-
port in transition countries. This means that the conventional winner–loser cleavage of 
the transition process is not as important as previously thought: distributional issues 
matter less than the aggregate national performance and experience. Political parties 
that garner support for the euro should therefore concentrate on economic consolida-
tion and political stability rather than politicizing a winner–loser cleavage. 
In an environment of volatility and uncertainty in post-communist Europe, macro 
variables of economic and historical-ideational factors have the strongest impact on 
public opinion. We assume that these variables are so powerful because they serve as fo-
cal points that provide guidance on the future path of transition. Thus, the importance 
of a thriving economy, a high state deficit, and historical memories for the support of 
the euro indicate that EMU membership has a meaning beyond that of belonging to a 
common currency area: The adoption of the euro is viewed as the necessary incentive to 
continue with the reform process, to leave the past behind, and to establish institutional 
trust as well as personal security. This implies that the opinion on the euro is not merely 
the expression of an EU issue. Instead, it is in large part a way of voting on free market 
reforms. Shifts in perceptions of free market reforms have critical implications for the 
support of the euro. It is therefore hoped that further research is done on designing 
models that take the peculiarities of post-communist countries into account.
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Appendix
Table 5 Additional statistics for collinearity diagnostics
Correlations (r) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Highest 
variance
Inflation 
factor
1 Government deficit 1.00 4.1
2 GDP per capita 0.12 1.00 2.1
3 Population size 0.45 –0.11 1.00 7.7
4 Vote share of Euro-
skeptic parties 0.64 –0.08 0.45 1.00 2.6
5 Trade sensitivity 0.30 –0.37 0.20 0.80 1.00 2.0
6 Months before  
next election –0.45 0.19 –0.35 –0.31 0.08 1.00 1.9
7 World War II casualties –0.26 –0.14 0.61 –0.19 –0.08 0.05 1.00 6.8
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